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Abstract
This paper views teacher quality through the human capital perspective. Teacher quality
exhibits substantial growth over teachers’ careers, but why it improves is not well understood.
I use a human capital production function nesting On-the-Job-Training (OJT) and Learningby-Doing (LBD) and experimental variation from Glewwe et al. (2010), a teacher incentive pay
experiment in Kenya, to discern the presence and relative importance of these forces. The
identified set for the OJT and LBD components has a closed-form solution, which depends on
experimentally estimated average treatment effects. The results provide evidence of an LBD
component, as well as an informative upper bound on the OJT component.
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Introduction

Teacher quality, typically measured by a teacher’s value added to student achievement, is an important determinant of student achievement and economic growth (Rivkin et al., 2005; Hanushek,
2011). While the research and policy focus has typically been on cross-sectional variation in teacher
quality, researchers have also documented substantial growth in quality over teachers’ careers (Harris and Sass, 2011; Wiswall, 2013; Papay and Kraft, 2015). For example, using data from North
Carolina, Wiswall (2013) finds that the average growth in teacher quality over 35 years of experience is equal to almost one standard deviation of the cross-sectional teacher quality among novice
teachers.
While the growth in quality over teachers’ careers is clearly important, little is known about
why it occurs.1 Economists have developed main two theories to explain how workers accumulate
human capital, which is then used to produce output: On-the-Job Training (OJT) and Learningby-Doing (LBD). In the “pure OJT” model, workers (in the current application, teachers) allocate
work time away from production (here, classroom teaching) to invest in their human capital (here,
e.g., teachers’ professional development) (Becker, 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967).2 This model implies a
tradeoff between current and future production because of the multitask problem (Hölmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991), which emerges because OJT investments are unobserved and, therefore, noncontractible. This tradeoff is not present under the “pure LBD” model, wherein workers accumulate
human capital via the act of production (Rosen, 1972; Blinder and Weiss, 1976).3 The strength
of these forces has implications for the design of effective education policy. For example, if OJT
was the main driver of teacher human capital accumulation then an incentive pay scheme that
increased current achievement could reduce long-run teacher quality, by diverting teachers from
making human capital investments. This would not be the case if instead LBD were the dominant
force.
Unfortunately, we do not know about the importance of OJT versus LBD forces among teachers,
or even workers more generally. Killingsworth (1982) shows there are no clear general testable
implications of the OJT versus LBD theories of human capital accumulation when using standard
observational data on workers. Additionally, as Heckman et al. (2002) discuss, identification in
such contexts is further hampered by equilibrium re-adjustments that occur in the private sector.4
This has left researchers and policymakers lacking even basic, qualitative information about even
the presence of OJT versus LBD forces for workers of any type. Indeed, prior empirical research
has adopted “pure” specifications, only allowing for either OJT or LBD as the force generating
1

I discuss below the two economics papers studying how teacher experience might affect quality.
For an example of an OJT-intensive job, consider being a student in school.
3
For an example of an LBD-intensive job, consider “chicken sexing”, where workers gain an ability to determine
the sex of baby chickens through their experience sorting chicks (McWilliams, 2018).
4
Researchers using the OJT framework (see, e.g., Haley, 1976; Heckman, 1976) typically circumvent the fact that
OJT investments are unobserved by solving for the optimal investment path in a worker’s dynamic program, which
yields estimates of the importance of OJT in the technology of human capital accumulation. See Kuruscu (2006) for
an example using a different approach.
2

2

human capital.5
To fill this gap, this paper develops a framework that yields new findings about the roles played
by OJT and LBD forces in the technology governing teacher human capital accumulation. In light
of the prominent identification difficulties, I adopt a partial identification approach to make the
source of identification as clear as possible. The identified set contains all of the values of the OJT
and LBD components of teacher human capital accumulation consistent with the data; this can
then be projected onto the marginal identified set for either component. I estimate the identified
set using data from an experimental intervention, Glewwe et al. (2010), which studies a teacher
performance pay scheme enacted across many sites across Kenya. Labor prices are often fixed
in the education sector because teachers are typically paid according to public salary schedules
(Podgursky and Springer, 2011) and worker-specific output is observed, even if noisily so, making
teacher quality trajectories a particularly attractive context for discriminating between OJT and
LBD.
The starting point is workhorse models that have become ubiquitous in empirical research
over the last five decades. The value-added (VA) model (Hanushek, 1971; Murnane, 1975), which
measures the contribution of different educational inputs to the production of student achievement,
is used in the overwhelming mass of research on teacher quality (for more recent examples, see Kane
et al., 2013; Chetty et al., 2014).6 The literature studying human capital accumulation has from its
inception typically used log-linear specifications when considering either OJT (Brown, 1976; Haley,
1976; Heckman, 1976) or LBD (Blinder and Weiss, 1976), and these specifications also continue
to dominate in more recent research (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1998; Fan et al., 2015; Blandin,
2018).7
I extend the modal specifications in the literature to nest both OJT and LBD forces. The resulting specification leverages experimentally estimated average treatment effects (ATEs) to report
key information about average tendencies and guarantees that identification is not driven by assumed nonlinearities in functional forms, while not being very restrictive compared to specifications
typically used in the literature. As in the “pure OJT” model, OJT investments are also unobserved
in my framework. This closely matches the teacher quality application, as a large body of research
has found that variables that seem like natural measures of training available to researchers, such
as formal professional development, teacher certification, or additional education (e.g., Master’s
degrees), do not help predict teacher quality (Hanushek, 2003; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Harris
and Sass, 2011; Podgursky and Springer, 2011; Jackson et al., 2014), and the general lack of avail5
This is also true of recent research studying heterogeneity in the returns to experience for teachers (Kraft and
Papay, 2014) or other types of workers (see, e.g., Shaw and Lazear, 2008; Haggag et al., 2017). Here, too, the
distinction between OJT versus LBD has implications for policy, as heterogeneous impacts of interventions would be
exacerbated or attenuated, depending on how human capital was generated.
6
See McCaffrey et al. (2003) and Hanushek and Rivkin (2012) for detailed discussions.
7
As discussed by Willis (1985), these specifications for human capital production had already had a long history
of use in labor economics as of three decades ago. These specifications are also consistent with those in the statistical
literature spawned by Abowd et al. (1999). See Shaw (1989) for an empirical model of LBD using a different
specification and see Fu et al. (2019) for an empirical model of OJT using a different specification.
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ability of data on how teachers allocate their work time (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2012). This means
my framework generates the classic identification problem of separating OJT and LBD forces.
Identification (i.e., informative parameter bounds) is obtained in the current paper because
Glewwe et al. (2010) includes a follow-up measurement of the effects of the program. The intuition
can be outlined in the following example: suppose that achievement increased in the treatment
group while the incentive scheme was in place (as was the case in Glewwe et al. 2010) and that the
random assignment of the intervention was balanced (as was also the case). Then the increase in
achievement during the intervention must have come from an increase in treatment-group teachers’
human capital allocated to production. Further, a positive treatment effect on achievement after
the intervention ended, beyond that accounted for by the persistence of the during-intervention
increase in achievement, would imply that teacher quality increased, pointing to the presence of
the LBD component. On the other hand, a post-intervention treatment effect lower than that
which could be explained by the persistence of the prior achievement effect would imply that
teacher quality decreased, pointing to the presence of the OJT component. Without the follow-up
data the identified set would be uninformative, meaning we would remain in the typical case in
which we could not separate OJT and LBD forces.
I find that the 95% confidence set for the identified set for each parameter is informative.
Specifically, the lower bound on the LBD component is greater than zero and the upper bound on
the OJT component is lower than its uninformative level. I reject the “pure OJT” specification
(in which LBD plays no role) at the 5% significance level, but I cannot reject the “pure LBD”
specification, as the confidence set for the OJT component contains zero. When further imposing
returns-to-scale type assumptions (i.e., restrictions on the sum of the OJT and LBD components in
human capital production), bounds are tighter. Under the strongest assumption, constant returns to
scale, the 95% confidence set for the LBD component lies strictly above that for the OJT component,
meaning in this case we can also say with appreciable certainty that the LBD component is larger
than the OJT component.
This paper’s framework generates several contributions. First, it works with a human capital
production function that nests both the OJT and LBD mechanisms, as opposed to the “pure”
specifications used in prior empirical work. This allows for standard hypothesis testing about
important qualitative features, in particular, the presence of either force in the human capital
production function. Second, it uses a partial identification approach that features a closed-form
solution for the identified set: it is a locus characterized by a line. This characterization sharply
contrasts with the literature’s lack of a proof showing how to separately identify OJT and LBD
forces, yet obtains quite naturally here. Moreover, the primary input to the identified set is an
experimentally estimated ATE, commonly viewed as the “gold standard” in causal inference. Thus,
it is also easy to estimate the identified set and to do inference on it, which is rare in the partial
identification literature (Imbens and Manski, 2004; Stoye, 2009; Tamer, 2010). Finally, the approach
does not have to make assumptions regarding the optimality of input choices or outcomes observed
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in the data.8
This paper seeks to understand the evolution of teacher quality from the perspective of the
dominant theories of human capital accumulation. Somewhat separately from the aforementioned
human capital literature, a small but substantively important set of papers examines other channels
underlying teachers’ improvement as they gain more experience. Ost (2014), which measures the returns to teachers’ general and grade-specific experience, finds both to be important determinants of
teacher quality growth. Cook and Mansfield (2016) extends this work to also allow for general and
context-specific permanent components to teacher quality. The current paper nicely complements
these papers by explicitly viewing teacher quality through the lens of the main conceptual frameworks for human capital, and by identifying and separating the OJT and LBD channels of human
capital accumulation, which are not necessary to distinguish given these other papers’ goals.9 This
paper also complements the extensive literature studying teacher quality more generally, recently
discussed in Hanushek and Rivkin (2006); Jackson et al. (2014); Strøm and Falch (2020), and the
sub-literature on teacher incentives (see, e.g., Hanushek and Raymond, 2005; Muralidharan and
Sundararaman, 2011; Imberman and Lovenheim, 2015; Petronijevic, 2016).10

2

Data and Variables

Study Design

Glewwe et al. (2010) implemented a teacher incentive pay scheme in Kenya, which

provided bonuses to teachers at schools where students did well on standardized exams administered
as part of the standard curriculum in Kenya. The treatment group was exposed to the incentive
scheme in 1998 and 1999, which I refer to as the “active-treatment” years. In addition to being
observed during active-treatment years, outcomes for both the treatment and control groups were
also observed for both a pre-treatment year (1997), and a post-active-treatment year (2000). Table
1 summarizes the study design.
Variables

I report on the variables that are needed for this paper’s analysis; readers are referred

to Glewwe et al. (2010) for additional details. I measure output using the incentivized standardized
achievement test presented in the main results of Glewwe et al. (2010), which is an average of
seven standardized subject-specific achievement tests, where standardization was performed with
respect to the means and standard deviations of the control group. It is important to note that the
8
Researchers with different goals, say, of examining heterogeneous impacts or understanding how teacher quality
would change under counterfactual incentive pay schemes, would have to make stronger statistical assumptions
and/or impose behavioral assumptions. This would naturally represent fruitful and complementary avenues for
future research.
9
These papers may be viewed as part of the substantial empirical literature studying task-specific human capital
for more general worker contexts. For recent examples, see Poletaev and Robinson (2008); Sanders (2010); Yamaguchi
(2012); Robinson (2018). Sanders and Taber (2012) contains a detailed discussion of this and other extensions of the
one-dimensional human capital model.
10
Although less tightly related, this paper also relates to the literature studying teacher labor markets (see, e.g.,
Dolton and Klaauw, 1999; Stinebrickner, 2001; Behrman et al., 2016; Tincani, 2021; Biasi, 2021; Bobba et al., 2021;
Biasi et al., 2021).
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Table 1: Design of the Glewwe et al. (2010) Teacher Incentive Pay Experiment

Group
Treatment
Control

Teacher incentive pay?
1997 1998 1999 2000
✗
✓
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✗

Note: “✓” indicates that members of the group (e.g., “Treatment”) received incentive pay in that year and “✗”
indicates that the group did not receive incentive pay that year.

experiment was balanced; of particular importance, the mean test scores in the pre-active-treatment
year were balanced between the control and treatment groups.11
The data also include information about whether teachers were present at schools and in classrooms during site visits, which are used as measures of teacher labor supply. While labor supply
is the (observable) input to human capital accumulation in the LBD framework, the classic OJT
framework treats OJT investments as unobserved. I do the same, for two reasons. First, Kuruscu
(2006), who considers general worker contexts, argues that it is more appropriate to treat on-thejob training as unobserved because some training may not be observed by researchers; while this
complicates identification in the typical setting, the current paper’s approach allows us to learn
about the importance of OJT and LBD forces despite this fundamental data limitation. Second,
the literature on teacher quality, which has largely focused on the United States, has consistently
found that observable training measures like Master’s degrees, professional development work, or
additional certificates are poor predictors of teacher quality (Hanushek, 2003; Hanushek and Rivkin,
2006; Harris and Sass, 2011; Podgursky and Springer, 2011). Conceptually, OJT investments result
in more effective teaching the next period, for example, a teacher might reflect on how her class
went and then use this to improve her craft. If the teachers did not have any scope for making OJT
investments, say, because they were inundated with classroom teaching duties, this would show up
in the estimates because I allow there to be no role played by this force. Treating OJT investments
as unobserved is therefore not only consistent with how the literature typically models OJT investments, but also makes the findings more applicable to contexts where measures of training have
been found to have little bearing on teacher quality.

3

Model

The model provides the foundation for the partial identification of the components governing human
capital accumulation. It describes how teachers allocate their human capital between on-the-job
skill investments, production of output (i.e., contemporaneous student achievement), and leisure.
The specifications for the production of human capital and output enable a closed-form constructive
identification proof and calculation of bounds using ATE estimates, meaning the analysis captures
11

As in Glewwe et al. (2010), I exclude one of the districts (Teso), which did not offer the achievement test in the
first year.
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average behavior.12 They are also not very restrictive either in terms of implications for behavior,13
or compared with specifications commonly used in the literature.14

3.1

Environment

Let the periods be indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, where t = 0 is the pre-treatment period, t = 1 is
the “active-treatment” period, in which teachers in the treatment group are offered output-based
incentives, and t = 2 is the post-active-treatment period, where teachers in either treatment or
control group no longer are offered the incentives. I do not refer to t = 1 as the “treatment period”
because, post active treatment, teachers in the treatment group may have been affected by their
decisions made during active treatment.
The human capital of teacher i in period t, θit , is produced according to
θit = δθ θit−1 + δI Iit−1 + δh hit−1 ,

(1)

where θit−1 is teacher i’s human capital last period, Iit−1 is teacher i’s on-the-job investment in
human capital last period, and hit−1 is the time teacher i spent on production (e.g., actively teaching, engaging in teaching preparation, providing feedback to students, etc.) last period. Output
produced by teacher i teaching student j in period t, yijt , which is measured by performance on
a standardized achievement test, follows a standard value-added specification (Hanushek, 1971;
Murnane, 1975; Hanushek, 1979):15
yijt = βθ θit + βh hit + βy yjt−1 + ϵijt ,

(2)

where yjt−1 is student j’s prior test achievement (meaning βy measures the persistence of student
knowledge), βθ θit + βh hit is teacher i’s value added to student j’s achievement in period t (i.e.,
quality), and ϵijt is an ex post IID productivity shock.16
Time spent producing output, hit , and on-the-job investment, Iit are rival, as captured by the
12
While averages are not the only conceivable objects of policy interest, they certainly have garnered a vast amount
of interest by researchers and policymakers, as they may average out unobserved heterogeneity and also may be useful
for certain normative considerations (e.g., maximizing output).
13
The human capital production function does not assume that growth in human capital is constant over time.
Indeed, as the model does not assume optimality of teacher behavior, it allows for, e.g., decreasing OJT investments
over the course of a teacher’s career, which would result in the concave value added profiles documented in the
literature.
14
The model developed in this section could be viewed as a log-linear approximation to a specification considering
the behavior of a representative teacher and student in each of the control and treatment groups (see Appendix A),
and is also consistent with (specifically, nested by) the commonly used translog specification used in the burgeoning
literature using dynamic factor models to understand skill growth (see, e.g., Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2020; Bono
et al., 2020; Freyberger, 2021). It is important to note that, while the link developed in the appendix might provide
useful context, it is in no way necessary to this paper’s analysis.
15
Recent research supports the view that controlling for prior achievement, as is done in a value-added model,
does a reasonably good job of controlling for unobserved prior inputs (see, e.g., Kinsler, 2012; Chetty et al., 2014).
16
I abstract from student characteristics here; as will become clear, what matters for the analysis is obtaining a
consistent estimate of βy .
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constraint
hit + Iit + lit = H,

(3)

where total work time is hit + Iit , and lit is teacher i’s leisure time in period t. The variables
h, I, and l could be viewed as shares of a teacher’s total time, or of a teacher’s overall focus
or potential effort respectively allocated to production, OJT investment, and leisure.17 Under the
latter interpretation, a teacher has a fixed “budget” of focus/potential effort, which can be allocated
between h, I, and l; naturally, a teacher must be working to engage in production or investment.
I use the term “time” hereafter, but it might be useful to keep these alternative interpretations in
mind. Although, as discussed below, there was no evidence of an average labor supply response
to the incentive pay scheme, I explicitly model labor supply for the potential application of this
approach to other contexts, and also allow for a labor supply response in the empirical application.
I assume that δk ∈ Dk , where Dk = [0, δ], for k = θ, I, h, and that βk ∈ Bk , where Bk = [0, β],
for k = θ, h, y. The lower bound of zero for each parameter captures the natural assumption means
that inputs cannot have negative effects, ceteris paribus. The upper bound for each parameter (i.e.,
δ or β) is taken to be large; I discuss below how the specific values of δ and β do not affect this
paper’s main findings.
I define the “pure OJT” specification for the human capital production function as δI > 0 and
δh = 0. Analogously, in the “pure LBD” specification, we have δh > 0 and δI = 0. Some scenarios representing different possibilities for true combinations of (δh , δI ) are illustrated in Figure 1
(bounds for the identified set for (δh , δI ), which is denoted dh × dI , are derived in Section 3.2). For
example, the point labeled “pure OJT”, on the horizontal axis, features a positive OJT component, with no LBD component, in contrast to the point labeled “pure LBD”, on the vertical axis.
The interior point, labeled “OJT and LBD both present”, represents the possibility that teachers
accumulate human capital via both OJT and LBD components; in contrast, the “pure” versions of
the OJT and LBD human capital production functions are mutually exclusive.

3.2

Derivation of Bounds

This section develops bounds for (δh , δI ) that only depend on period-specific estimates of the
average treatment effects of the intervention on student achievement and on labor supply, and an
estimate of the persistence of student knowledge (which could be estimated using the same dataset,
or obtained from another source). The bounds are sharp, meaning they contain only the values of
(δh , δI ) that cannot be rejected given the data. For example, the sharp bound on δI would increase
the lower bound for δI as much as possible while still being consistent with the data; if the lower
bound were greater than zero one would reject the pure LBD specification.
Define the mean difference between the treatment and control groups for variable z in period t
17
Because the data contain measures of leisure time, we can also identify total work time. However, the individual
components of total work time are not separately observed, which means the scale of hit + Iit is fixed by the measure
of lit (which is discussed in detail in Section 4.1).
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Figure 1: Examples of OJT and LBD Specifications
δ

OJT and LBD
both present

δh
pure LBD

neither present

pure OJT

0

δI

as ∆zt := ztT − ztC , where ztT and ztC respectively denote the treatment and control group means
of z in t.
First, note that in any period the constant time endowment implies that
∆ht + ∆It + ∆lt = 0.

(4)

For the pre-treatment period, t = 0, the mean difference in achievement between the treatment
and control groups is
∆y0 = βθ ∆θ0 +βh ∆h0 +βy ∆y−1 + ∆ϵ0 = 0,
|{z}
|{z}
| {z } |{z}
=0

=0

=0

(5)

=0

i.e., a balanced experimental design implies there will be no average difference in the pre-treatment
average scores. Consistent with Glewwe et al. (2010), I assume the experiment was implemented
with high fidelity, and consequently omit ∆ϵt hereafter.
For the active-treatment period, t = 1, we have
∆y1 = βθ ∆θ1 +βh ∆h1 + βy ∆y0 = βh ∆h1 .
|{z}
|{z}
=0

(6)

=0

Equation (6) shows that the difference between treatment and control achievement in the activetreatment period can only come from the change in mean production time ∆h1 , as the fact that
θit depends on lagged inputs and balance between the treatment and control groups implies that
∆θ0 = 0, while, as shown in eq. (5), balance between the treatment and control groups implies that

9

∆y0 = 0.
The mean difference in achievement between the treatment and control groups for the postactive-treatment period, t = 2, is
∆y2 = βθ ∆θ2 + βh ∆h2 + βy ∆y1
= βθ δI ∆I1 + βθ δh ∆h1 + βh ∆h2 + βy ∆y1
= βθ δI [−∆l1 − ∆h1 ] +[βθ δh + βh βy ]∆h1 + βh ∆h2
|
{z
}
=∆I1 , from eq. (4)



βθ δh − βθ δI + βh βy
= −βθ δI ∆l1 +
βh


∆y
|{z}1

+βh ∆h2 ,

(7)

βh ∆h1 , from eq. (6)

which uses ∆θ1 = 0 to go from the first to the second line and eq. (6) to go from the second
to the third line. Equation (7) shows that, in general, only a locus of (δh , δI ) will be identified,
and, further, that many other variables appear in the same equation: the achievement production function parameters (βθ , βh , βy ) and, even after using eq. (6) to eliminate ∆h1 , the quantities
(∆y1 , ∆y2 , ∆l1 , ∆h2 ).18 The upper bound on the parameter spaces for δh and δI , δ, is also unknown. I estimate (βy , ∆y1 , ∆y2 , ∆l1 ) in Section 4.1. However, ∆h2 is unobserved and it cannot
be eliminated, as was ∆h1 via eq. (6).
I now discuss how I arrive at values for (βθ , βh , δ, ∆h2 ). First note that βθ can be normalized
to 1 because it is attached to the latent variable θt . I show below that ∆y1 is significantly greater
than zero (i.e., there was a positive effect of the intervention during the active-treatment period).
In light of eq. (6) and the fact that βh ≥ 0, it is then reasonable to treat βh as strictly positive, as
the positive effect on achievement during the active-treatment period could only be rationalized by
an increase in time allocated to production (i.e., ∆h1 ≥ 0). Because the scale of βh is not identified
separately from δ, I fix βh = 1 and δ = 1 hereafter.19 It is important to note that the specific values
of βh and δ do not affect the main findings, such as whether bounds are informative or whether I
can reject either the “pure OJT” or “pure LBD” specifications.20
Assumption 1 summarizes the parameter values discussed thus far. Assumption 1(i) is maintained hereafter. Assumption 1(ii) corresponds to making no returns to scale assumption on the
human capital production function. Section 3.4 explores how stronger assumptions about the returns to scale would tighten the identified set.
18

Note that δθ does not appear in eq. (7). Intuitively, this parameter measures how differences in teacher human
capital emanating from differences in inputs from two periods ago affect production today; the balanced experimental
design means these differences are all zero, causing δθ to drop out.
19
If the researcher viewed the model as a (log-linearized) approximation to a nonlinear model (see Appendix A
for discussion), it would be natural to have βh = 1 (i.e., the same as βθ , which is consistent with the interpretation
that a teacher’s output equals her share of human capital allocated to production), and also to not allow δh or δI to
exceed 1 (i.e., δ = 1).
20
There are possible parameter values where the results would be affected by the choice of βh relative to δ, but
the estimated parameters are far from this region.
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Assumption 1 (Baseline, no returns to scale assumption). invisible ink
(i) βθ = 1, βh = 1
(ii) (δh , δI ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1].
Finally, if there do not exist income effects, wherein the level of θt or prior compensation
substantially affect how teachers allocate their time, then the increase in output-based pay for the
treatment group has two useful implications: (i) time allocated to production will not decrease in
the active-treatment period, i.e., ∆h1 ≥ 0 and (ii) in the post-active-treatment period, even though
there may be a mean difference in θ2 between the treatment and control groups, h2 will be similar in
both the treatment and control groups. As discussed above, the data are consistent with ∆h1 > 0,
which is consistent with the absence of such income effects. Arguably, this makes it reasonable to
operate under the assumption that ∆h2 = 0, as the data do not reject the assumption upon which
this was predicated. It is important to note that the assumption that ∆h2 = 0 does not rule out
the intervention increasing a teacher’s productivity by way of, e.g., preparing materials that could
also be used in subsequent years. This increased productivity would be captured by a higher level
of θ2 , which could be generated by either OJT or LBD forces.
Using the values obtained thus far, eq. (7) becomes
∆y2 = [δh − δI + βy ] ∆y1 − δI ∆l1 ,
which we can rearrange to get the following expression for the LBD component δh as a function of
the OJT component δI and remaining parameters:



∆l1
∆y2
− βy + δI 1 +
,
δh =
∆y1
∆y1


(8)

i.e., eq. (8) characterizes the identified set, dh × dI . We can find the identified set for either
parameter by projecting the locus characterized by eq. (8) onto the relevant axis, e.g., dh can be
obtained by projecting dh × dI onto the δh -axis. It will be convenient to rewrite eq. (8) as
δh = πicept + πslope δI ,
where the intercept of the locus of permissible combinations of (δh , δI ) is πicept :=
slope of the locus is πslope := 1 +

(9)
∆y2
∆y1

− βy and the

∆l1
∆y1 .

Note that, even with the parameter values obtained so far, the relationship between (δh , δI ) still
depends on (βy , ∆y1 , ∆y2 , ∆l1 ). Section 4.1 discusses estimation of these parameters. Briefly, all
but βy are estimated using the experimental variation. A statistical technique (treatment-year fixed
effects in the production function, coupled with the statistical assumption that the experiment was
appropriately balanced) yields consistent estimates of βy when using just control group data.21
21

This is because, for teacher-student pair ij in group g (i.e., treatment or control), we have Eij∈g [yijt ] =

11

3.3

Comparative Statics

We can understand the restrictions afforded by eq. (8) by considering some cases, where for the sake
of illustration assume ∆y1 > 0. We start by maintaining Assumption 1. First suppose that ∆l1 = 0
and suppose that

∆y2
∆y1

− βy = πicept = 0; this corresponds to case (a) in Table 2. Intuitively, the

increase in test score coming via the positive effect of ∆h1 on ∆y1 entirely accounts for ∆y2 . The
first line of eq. (7) then implies that ∆θ2 = 0, i.e., teacher human capital post-active-treatment is
on average the same in the treatment and control groups. Further, ∆l1 = 0 (i.e., πslope = 1) implies
that ∆I1 = −∆h1 , meaning the only way to satisfy eq. (8) is for δI = δh . That is, any increase in
δI can satisfy the condition by a concomitant increase in δh . Without further information on either
of these parameters, we cannot shrink the identified set. This scenario corresponds to the dashed,
45-degree, line in the left panel of Figure 2. Projecting the identified set onto each axis, we can see
that the marginal identified set for either δI or δh (depicted by the dashed lines just outside that
parameter’s axis) has not shrunk at all, because any feasible value of, e.g., δI , can be rationalized
by the same value for the coefficient on the other input to teacher human capital (in this example,
δh ). That is, the bounds in this case are uninformative.
Next consider case (b), which differs from case (a) in that

∆y2
∆y1

− βy < 0, i.e., teacher human

capital is lower in the treatment group, post active treatment (∆θ2 < 0). Because we still have
∆I1 = −∆h1 , the fact that ∆θ2 < 0 means that we can rule out very low values of δI —the
OJT component—and very high values of δh —the LBD component. Intuitively, if the net effect
of increasing time spent on production on teacher human capital is negative, knowing that ∆I1 =
−∆h1 implies that the OJT parameter must be larger than the LBD one. At the same time,
the slope of eq. (8) is unaffected because the one-to-one tradeoff between different time uses in
the budget constraint (due to there being no average change in leisure time) implies a one-to-one
tradeoff between δI and δh . This case is depicted by the dotted lines in the left panel of Figure 2.
In cases (a) and (b), there was no average difference in leisure time between the treatment and
control groups during the active-treatment period (i.e., ∆l1 = 0, or πslope = 1). Consider now case
(c), where we start from case (b) but now assume that ∆l1 < 0 (here, πslope < 1). Here, we know
that ∆I1 > −∆h1 , i.e., the absolute difference in investment is smaller than the absolute difference
in production time. As shown in the dash-dotted lines in the left panel, this rotates the locus
eq. (8) downward from the intercept (which was already negative, as the starting point was case
(b)), increasing the lower bound on δI and decreasing the upper bound on δh . Intuitively, all else
equal, a smaller change in investment must be coupled with a relatively bigger technological effect
of investment (δI ) to rationalize the same data.
The cases discussed above are not exhaustive. For example, the signs of

∆y2
∆y1

−βy or ∆l1 could be

opposite to those considered in cases (b) or (c), in which case the sharp bounds would be different.
Eij∈g [βθ θijt + βh hit ] +βy Eij∈g [yijt−1 ] + Eij∈g [ϵijt+1 ] and Eij∈g [βθ θijt + βh hit ] can be measured by the coefficient
|
{z
}
=0

on a group-period indicator variable.
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An example of this is case (d), which is depicted in the right panel of Figure 2, which illustrates
how strengthening returns-to-scale-type assumptions yields tighter sharp bounds for the identified
set. The next section explores this.

3.4

Bounds with Increasing Assumption Strength

A researcher might further find it natural to restrict the returns to scale in the human capital
production function, by assuming they are nonincreasing. This is Assumption 2 below. Even
stronger, the researcher might believe it reasonable to assume constant returns to scale (Assumption
3). This exploration of how assumptions about δh + δI affect the identified sets is in the spirit of the
““worst-case”” approach of Horowitz and Manski (2000), which examines the sensitivity of findings
to stronger sets of assumptions, some of which are made in the literature. It does not constitute
an endorsement of making these stronger assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Nonincreasing returns to scale (NIRS)). Assumption 1(i) and δh + δI ≤ 1.
Assumption 3 (Constant returns to scale (CRS)). Assumption 1(i) and δh + δI = 1.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the additional information embedded in assumptions about
the returns to scale for (δh , δI ), starting with Assumption 1 (case (d)); these cases are summarized in
the lower part of Table 2. Case (d2) further imposes the restriction that δh +δI ≤ 1 (Assumption 2),
which means permissible combinations of (δh , δI ) lie in the south/west right triangle.22 By looking
at the dotted lines in the right panel of Figure 2, corresponding to this case, we can see that the
marginal identified sets are tighter than those in case (d). Intuitively, the tighter upper bound for
δh , combined with the nonincreasing returns to scale assumed in case (d2), yields a tighter upper
bound for δI . Case (d3) further imposes the restriction that δh + δI = 1 (Assumption 3), which
affords point identification (interior solid point in the right panel of Figure 2).

3.5

Expressions for Marginal Identified Sets

This section ends by characterizing the marginal identified sets for δh and δI , which are used in
estimating the parameters’ bounds and confidence sets. Under Assumption 1, i.e., when making
no additional assumptions about returns to scale, we can derive the identified set for δh , dh , by
varying δI over its domain, resulting in
δh ∈ [max{πicept , 0}, min{πicept + πslope , 1}].
22

(10)

Note that this restriction in itself would not yield any information; without data (e.g., information about πicept ),
the bounds on either parameter, obtained from projecting the south/west right triangle onto either axis, would be
uninformative.
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Table 2: Bounds: Comparative Statics and Effects of Returns-to-Scale Assumptions
∆y2
∆y1

− βy

Notes on bounds

0

0

Uninformative

δh ≤ 1, δI ≤ 1

0

<0

Informative

(c)

δh ≤ 1, δI ≤ 1

<0

<0

Tighter than (b)

(d)

δh ≤ 1, δI ≤ 1

0

>0

Informative

(d2)

δh + δI ≤ 1

0

>0

Tighter than (d)

(d3)

δh + δI = 1

0

>0

Point identification

(δh , δI ) ∈

∆l1

(a)

δh ≤ 1, δI ≤ 1

(b)

Case

Note: ∆y1 > 0. Cases (a)-(c) correspond to comparative statics, and cases (d)-(d3) correspond to different returnsto-scale assumptions.

Solving eq. (9) instead for δI , we can analogously obtain dI by varying δh over its domain:





δh − πicept
−πicept
1 − πicept
δI =
⇒ δI ∈ max
, 0 , min
,1 .
πslope
πslope
πslope

(11)

Invoking non-increasing returns to scale (Assumption 2) does not affect the lower bound of dh ,
but does tighten its upper bound:
δh = πicept + πslope δI ⇒ δh ≤ πicept + πslope [1 − δh ] ⇒



πicept + πslope
δh ∈ max {πicept , 0} , min
,1 .
1 + πslope

(12)

We can analogously tighten the upper bound on dI by applying Assumption 2:
δh = πicept + πslope δI ⇒ [1 − δI ] ≥ πicept + πslope δI ⇒ [1 + πslope ]δI ≤ 1 − πicept





−πicept
1 − πicept
δI ∈ max
, 0 , min
,1 .
πslope
1 + πslope

(13)

Finally, imposing Assumption 3, we achieve point identification for both parameters:
δh = πicept + πslope [1 − δh ] ⇒ δh
[1 − δI ] = πicept + πslope δI ⇒ δI
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=

πicept + πslope
1 + πslope
1 − πicept
=
.
1 + πslope

(14)
(15)

Figure 2: Illustration of Example Identified Set Cases
dh

dh

(c)(b)(a)

(d2) (d)

1

1
δh ≤ 1
δI ≤ 1

(d3)

(a): δI = δh

δh

πicept

δh
(b): δI > δh

δI + δh ≤ 1
(c): δI >> δh
0

(a)
(b)
(c)

0

(d)

dI

dI
(d2)

δI

δI

Note: Marginal identified sets for parameters are indicated by the lines outside their respective axes. Cases depicted
in the figure are summarized in Table 2. The left panel corresponds to comparative statics, cases (a)-(c). The right
panel corresponds to different returns-to-scale assumptions, cases (d)-(d3).

4

Empirical Results

4.1

Estimation of Parameters Determining Identified Set for (δh , δI )

From eq. (8), the identified set for (δh , δI ) depends on (∆y1 , ∆y2 , βy , ∆l1 ). This section discusses
how these parameters are estimated, and Section 4.2 shows how the resulting marginal identified
sets for (δh , δI ) are estimated.
I pool the two active-treatment years to map the empirical application, which spans four years
of data, to the three-period structure of the model. The pre-treatment year (1997) corresponds
to model period t = 0. Both active-treatment years (1998 and 1999) are pooled into one period,
corresponding to t = 1 in the model, and the post-active-treatment year (2000) corresponds to
t = 2. While the estimates presented here are based on the pooled data, I have examined their
sensitivity to using unpooled data when feasible (i.e., for βy , which can be estimated without the
experimental variation), and the results were essentially unaffected.
Table 3 presents the achievement ATE results for the active-treatment period (active ∗ treated)
and the post-active treatment period (post ∗ treated). I also include the treatment year as a
regressor (active-treatment, post-active-treatment) to control for secular trends. The results for the
treatment group in the active-treatment period indicate that the average treatment effect pooled
over both active-treatment years, ∆y1 , is positive and significantly different than zero (0.089).
The next row indicates that student achievement in the post-active-treatment year, ∆y2 , remained
significantly higher (0.098) in the treatment group. Through the lens of the model, this positive
15

Table 3: Estimates of ATEs on Achievement
Dependent variable:
Test score yijt
active-treatment (t = 1)

0.001
(0.019)

post-active-treatment (t = 2)

−0.001
(0.017)

active ∗ treated (∆y1 )

0.089∗∗∗
(0.013)

post ∗ treated (∆y2 )

0.098∗∗∗
(0.025)

Constant

0.007
(0.008)

Observations

26,537

Note: ∗ p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01. The t corresponds to a pooled period.

ATE could be due to persistence of higher achievement from the active-treatment period and
(potentially) higher teacher human capital for the treatment group in the post-active-treatment
period. Establishing the relative importance of these effects is the goal of the next section.
Table 4 presents an estimate of the persistence component βy using control group data, where
the lagged score is that from the previous pooled period. I estimate the persistence component
to be 0.544, and statistically greater than zero. The estimate of persistence is not driven by
the use of pooled data: when instead using unpooled data the estimate is 0.618. Even more to
the point, this estimate is in the range of those in Andrabi et al. (2011), which estimated the
persistence of a variety of cognitive skills using a dynamic panel data model applied to Pakistani
schoolchildren. Allowing for both measurement error and unobserved student heterogeneity (in
contrast with the specifications researchers have typically used to estimate achievement production
functions), they estimate the (annual) persistence of cognitive skills to range from 0.2 to 0.55,
across a variety of subjects. Indeed, they argue that the upper part of their range is possibly too
high. This matters because a smaller value of βy will further tighten the estimated bounds, in light
of the achievement ATE estimates, which already yield a positive, significant, estimate of πicept .
Intuitively, the post-active treatment achievement ATE is higher than can be explained by the
active-treatment achievement ATE persisting into post-active treatment, pointing to the presence
of an LBD component; lowering the value of βy would only make this effect more prominent.
I now discuss how I obtain a value for the effect of the intervention on leisure during the active16

Table 4: Estimate of the Persistence Component
Dependent variable:
Test score yijt
0.544∗∗∗
(0.010)

lagged score yj,t−1 (βy )

−0.047∗∗∗
(0.008)

Constant

Observations
∗

∗∗

5,007

∗∗∗

Note: p<0.1; p<0.05;
p<0.01. These estimates are obtained from a regression of current test score on the
lagged test score, run on the pooled data for pooled periods 1 and 2, for the control group. Specifically, the (period)
t subindex on the test score yijt refers to a pooled period, meaning student j’s lagged test score, yj,t−1 , is the one
from the previous pooled period.

treatment period, ∆l1 . The literature estimating OJT models of human capital accumulation
typically treats total work time (which I define to be the sum of time spent in production and
investment) as observed (see, e.g., Brown, 1976; Heckman, 1976). I follow this literature and use
measures of total work time, which are sufficient for the current paper because the change in total
work time (∆It + ∆ht ) is the complement of the change in leisure (∆lt ).
The Glewwe et al. (2010) data contain two measures of teachers’ total work time in a period:
(i) the fraction of teachers in attendance at the school during a site visit by the research team that
period and (ii) the fraction of teachers present in their classroom during the site visit.23 Glewwe
et al. (2010) finds no evidence that teachers in the treatment group on average altered their school
attendance or classroom presence (see Table 5, Panels A and B, columns (2) and (3)). While either
would be a reasonable measure of total work time, it seems more appropriate to use the share of
teachers present at the school, as teachers could make on-the-job investments outside the classroom
(e.g., to avoid being interrupted by students). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Table 5 shows the treatment
effect on the share of teachers in attendance, -0.017, is not significantly different from zero.24 This
means the point estimate for the effect on leisure, which is the negative of the effect on total work
time, is positive, at 0.017 (and, naturally, also insignificantly different from zero).25

4.2

Estimates of Bounds

The parameters characterizing the identified set for (δh , δI ), πicept and πslope , can be estimated
\
∆l1
2
using π
bicept := ∆y
bslope := 1\
+ ∆y
, which are computed using plug-in estimators. To
∆y1 − βy and π
1
simulate the joint distribution of (b
πicept , π
bslope ), taking into account the variability of the inputs
23

Teacher-level data on either measure were not available in the data, so I use school-period-level averages.
I also include the treatment year as a regressor here to control for secular trends.
25
Given that the point estimate of the effect on leisure is small and insignificant, the estimated bounds and
confidence sets are similar if I instead fix ∆l1 = 0.
24
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Table 5: Estimate of ATE on Teacher Attendance
Dependent variable:
Present at school in period t
active-treatment (t = 1)

0.012
(0.025)

post-active-treatment (t = 2)

0.052∗∗
(0.025)

active ∗ treated (∆l1 )

−0.017
(0.029)

post ∗ treated

−0.011
(0.041)

Constant

0.833∗∗∗
(0.014)

Observations

202

Note: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01. Dependent variable is school-level average share of site visits during which
teachers were in attendance. The t corresponds to a pooled period.

c 1 ), where in each
c 1 , ∆y
c 2 , βby , ∆l
to the plug-in estimators, I bootstrap the joint distribution of (∆y
bootstrap replication, the individual elements are estimated as described just above.26
I provide an overview here of how I estimate the bounds and confidence sets for the parameters;
see Algorithm 1 in Appendix B for more detail. I first construct the identified set, dˆh × dˆI , and
then project this set onto each marginal dimension, and then construct confidence sets to contain
each parameter (not the identified set for each parameter) at the pre-specified significance level (I
use a confidence level of 95%). Estimated bounds are the average across the identified sets. By
projecting the identified set onto the marginal dimensions, I avoid the problem of overly conservative
confidence sets described by Kaido et al. (2019). That being said, the estimated confidence sets are
virtually identical when containing parameter or identified set with particular probability, because
each confidence set contains at least one end point of the parameter space.
Results

Figure 3 illustrates the estimated bounds and 95% confidence sets for δh and δI under

the different assumptions about δh + δI . The table below presents the corresponding estimates and
also reports bound widths. Starting with the LBD parameter in panel (a), we can see that when we
do not impose a returns-to-scale-type assumption (“none”), the estimated upper and lower bounds
(thick, black, line) for δh are informative, and the lower bound is greater than zero at the 95%
26

I bootstrap using 100,000 replications of the data, stratified by treatment status.
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confidence level (thin, grey, line), leading us to reject the pure OJT specification (in which δh = 0).
Similarly, in panel (b) we can see that the estimated upper and lower bounds for δI are informative,
and that the 95% confidence set for δI does not contain the upper bound of 1 when no assumption
about returns to scale is made (“none”).
Imposing non-increasing returns to scale (“NIRS” on the horizontal axis in each panel) tightens
the estimated upper bound for δh , although it does not affect the 95% confidence set, because the
estimated lower bound, which governs the lower bound of the confidence set, is unchanged. However,
imposing NIRS does tighten the estimated upper bound and upper bound on the confidence sets for
δI . Intuitively, high values of both δh and δI are no longer mutually feasible under NIRS, lowering
the upper bounds for both parameters. Consequently, we can see in the accompanying table that
the width of the estimated bounds falls by about one half for both parameters when imposing NIRS
(e.g., from 0.433 to 0.233 for δh ), and the same is true of the width of the 95% confidence set for
δI . Finally, imposing constant returns to scale (“CRS” on the horizontal axis in each panel) yields
point identification for both parameters, corresponding to the smallest width confidence sets. The
estimated bounds are of course zero width in this case.
Overall, under all the assumptions about returns to scale, the achievement ATE in the postactive-treatment period is larger than would be accounted for by the positive ATE in the activetreatment period (caused by an increase in h1 , an input to contemporaneous student achievement)
and persistence of this increased student achievement. That is, the OJT component, operating
through ∆I1 ≤ 0, is dominated by the LBD component, operating through ∆h1 > 0. We can reject
the “pure OJT” specification in which δh = 0 across all returns-to-scale assumptions at the 95%
confidence level. However, we cannot reject that δI = 0 in any of the returns-to-scale assumptions
at the 95% confidence level; this means we cannot reject the “pure LBD” specification. Further,
if one were willing to assume CRS, then one could infer that δh was greater than δI , as the 95%
confidence sets under CRS do not overlap; the same cannot be said under either of the weaker
assumptions.
Discussion

The finding that LBD, at least in part, explains growth in teacher quality means that,

on average, teachers improve by teaching their students. Of course, teachers might also improve by
making OJT investments, as the confidence set for the OJT component includes strictly positive
values. While this might seem quite intuitive, economists to date had not been able to identify the
force within human capital theory behind why teacher quality should increase with experience.
Coming back to the specific context underlying this paper’s estimates, Glewwe et al. (2010)
assessed that the intervention may have increased “teaching to the test”, not more general student
knowledge. They surmised this because, in contrast to the results for the incentivized exam (used in
the current paper), student achievement for a non-incentivized exam that covered similar material
did not significantly increase in the treatment group during active treatment. That being said,
it is important to note that the associated change in teacher human capital was not limited to
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Figure 3: Estimated Bounds and Confidence Sets
(a) δh : LBD

(b) δI : OJT

1.00

1.00

0.75

0.75

0.50

0.50

0.25

0.25

0.00

0.00
none

NIRS

CRS

none

NIRS

CRS

Notes: The left panel depicts estimated bounds (
) and 95% confidence sets (
) for δh , under Assumptions 1,
2, and 3 (denoted on the bottom axis via “none”, “NIRS”, and “CRS”, respectively). The right panel depicts the
analogous results for δI .

Parameter
δh

δI

Ass. about δh + δI
1: none
2: NIRS
3: CRS

Estimated bounds
min
max width
0.565 0.998
0.433
0.565 0.798
0.233
0.798 0.798
0

1: none
2: NIRS
3: CRS

0.003
0.003
0.202

0.378
0.202
0.202

0.375
0.199
0

95% confidence set
min
max width
0.067
1
0.933
0.067
1
0.933
0.562
1
0.438
0
0
0

0.853
0.438
0.438

0.853
0.438
0.438

Notes: Assumption 1 corresponds to no assumption about the returns to scale for δh + δI , and Assumptions 2 and 3
respectively correspond to non-increasing returns to scale and constant returns to scale.
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a one-time change contained only to the active treatment period, as it did show up in the postactive-treatment period, meaning that the current paper does identify a force generating a form of
teacher human capital. However, just as the above assessment of Glewwe et al. (2010) warrants a
modicum of caution when interpreting the findings of that paper, it does so for those of this paper
too.
While I use the incentivized test to most clearly demonstrate the current methodology for
separately identifying OJT and LBD, we can also use the developed framework to help think about
the importance of LBD versus OJT in generating (desirable) teacher human capital, even in light
of the above caveat. Somewhat loosely, imagine there were two forms of OJT investment, one for
“incentivized teacher human capital”, and another for more general (or unincentivized) teacher
human capital, and analogously that a teacher can allocate her time to production of either form of
human capital in her students (which could manifest in different degrees in student achievement).
Through the lens of the model it still must be the case that ∆h1 > 0, i.e., teacher human capital
allocated to production increased in the treatment group during the active-treatment period. While
all we know is that this increase in production time may have been directed to incentivized (and
not more general) student knowledge, the fact that total work hours did not change means the OJT
investment likely decreased for either type of human capital. Then, the fact that the post-active
treatment effect was still greater than that which would be explained by the persistence of the
active-treatment achievement effect is still consistent with OJT not playing the paramount role,
insofar as achievement depended on both test-specific and general inputs.

5

Conclusion

I develop a framework nesting the OJT and LBD forces of human capital accumulation, and derive
theoretical bounds for OJT and LBD components. The developed bounds are sharp, and yield novel
information about the presence and relative importance of the forces generating human capital. The
derived bounds only require information about ATEs and the persistence of student achievement.
The estimated bounds are informative, and under even the weakest assumptions about the returns
to scale allow one to reject the “pure OJT” model. That is, the data are consistent with the
presence of an LBD component to teacher human capital accumulation. This suggests the dynamic
multitasking problem inherent to the “pure OJT” model is at least tempered by the presence of an
LBD component to human capital accumulation.
Overall, this paper constitutes an important step towards designing effective educational policy
that targets teachers and also shows how a partial identification approach can exploit existing
data, designed for another purpose, to answer an important policy relevant question. This paper’s
framework could also be applied to other contexts, in education and otherwise. It is common
to collect follow-up measures to gauge the longer-run effects of educational interventions. The
framework developed in this paper provides a way to interpret such follow-up data on interventions
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targeting teachers, through the lens of classic conceptual frameworks for human capital: longerrun effects stem from the persistence of student knowledge and changes in teacher human capital.
Future teacher incentive pay experiments that collected follow-up data would be able to apply this
paper’s methodology to identify the forces underlying teacher human capital growth. The strategy
developed in this paper could also be adapted to other applications in which there were outcomebased incentives and a followup measure of output, to quantify the importance of different channels
underlying human capital development.27
In light of the well known identification difficulties, it may be surprising that we can learn
something new about human capital accumulation, even under the transparent and relatively simple
approach taken here. While this paper focuses on the straightforward bounds attainable under
the specifications most commonly used in the literatures on teacher quality and human capital,
it is important to note that other assumptions and different estimation methods would also yield
estimates, but these would likely be less transparent due to being cast in a less tractable framework.
A very promising, complementary, tack would be the structural econometric approach, which would
require different (some stronger) assumptions but could then also answer other important questions
about the importance of OJT and LBD forces in teachers’ human capital accumulation. Such an
approach would also be well-suited to rationalize the observed patterns in the data, and would yield
other benefits, such as allowing for heterogeneity in teacher human capital accumulation trajectories
and, thus, heterogeneity in the growth of teacher quality. It would also permit simulation of behavior
and outcomes under counterfactual incentive schemes. This is left for future research.

27
In this vein, note that I maintain the classic OJT assumption that training investments are unobserved, which
increases its applicability to other contexts.
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APPENDIX

A

Relationship to a Log-Linear Specification

This section illustrates one way in which the linear technologies (1)-(2) relate to nonlinear specifications. The illustration considers a representative teacher, teaching a representative student, in
each of the control and treatment groups; therefore I suppress the teacher and student subscripts
in this section. I maintain the assumption of balance of the experimental design.
Consider the following production function for teacher human capital, denoted here as κit :
κ
[κt−1 ιt−1 ]γι [κt−1 ζt−1 ]γζ ,
κt = κγt−1

(16)

where κt−1 is the teacher’s human capital last period (which may depreciate), ιt−1 is the share
of the teacher’s human capital last period spent on OJT investment, and ζt−1 is the share of the
teacher’s human capital last period spent on production. The parameters of interest, respectively
representing the OJT and LBD components of human capital accumulation in (16), are (γι , γζ ) ∈
[0, 1]2 .28
Using ˜ to denote the logarithm of a variable, we can write the log-linearized version of the
human capital production function, eq. (16):
κ̃t = [γκ + γι + γζ ]κ̃t−1 + γι ι̃t−1 + γζ ζ̃t−1 .

(17)

Let wt measure the cognitive skill of the student in period t, which is produced according to29
λ

λw
,
wt = κλt κ ζt ζ wt−1

(18)

w̃t = λκ κ̃t + λζ ζ̃t + λw w̃t−1 .

(19)

which, in logs, is

This equation is a log-linearized value added specification for cognitive achievement, where the
value added to log achievement is λκ κ̃t + λζ ζ̃t .
As before, the bounds on the parameters of interest will depend on the ATEs for achievement
and leisure. With a representative teacher and student, we have ∆z̃t = z̃tT − z̃tC for z = κ, ι, ζ, w.
For the pre-treatment period, t = 0, the mean difference in achievement between the treatment
and control groups is
∆w̃0 = λκ ∆κ̃0 +λζ ∆ζ̃0 +λw ∆w̃−1 = 0,
|{z}
|{z}
| {z }
=0

=0

28

(20)

=0

Note that the unit interval is conservative, as it allows for parameter values that could yield explosive growth
and would thus likely be ruled out a priori if estimating this model.
29
I have not included an error because there is a representative student in each group.
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i.e., a balanced experimental design implies there will be no average difference in the pre-treatment
average scores, as was also the case in Section 3.2.
For the active-treatment period, t = 1, we have
∆w̃1 = λκ ∆κ̃1 +λζ ∆ζ̃1 + λw ∆w̃0 = λζ ∆ζ̃1 .
|{z}
|{z}
=0

(21)

=0

Similar to eq. (6), eq. (21) shows that the difference between treatment and control achievement
in the active-treatment period can only come from the change in mean working time, ∆ζ̃1 .
The mean difference in achievement between the treatment and control groups for the postactive-treatment period, t = 2, is
∆w̃2 = λκ ∆κ̃2 + λζ ∆ζ̃2 + λw ∆w̃1
= λκ γι ∆ι̃1 + λκ γζ ∆ζ̃1 + λζ ∆ζ̃2 + λw ∆w̃1 ,

(22)

which uses ∆θ1 = 0 to go from the first to the second line. Noting that the intervention had no
effect on leisure, we have
∆ζt + ∆ιt = 0,

(23)

i.e., the effect on OJT investment is opposite that on production shares. Substituting using eqs. (21)
and (23) and maintaining the assumption that post-active treatment production shares will not be
different between the control and treatment groups (i.e., ∆ζ̃2 = 0), eq. (22) becomes


λκ γζ − λκ γι + λζ λw
∆w̃2 =
λζ


∆w̃1 .
| {z }

(24)

λζ ∆ζ̃1 , from eq. (21)

The last step is to obtain values for the relevant quantities in (24), λκ , λζ , λw , ∆w̃1 , ∆w̃2 . Analogous to Section 4, I set λκ = 1 and λζ = 1; both of these are normalizations of sorts,30 and these
parameters having the same value is consistent with a teacher’s value added being the share of her
human capital allocated to production. Next consider the remaining parameters, λw , ∆w̃1 , ∆w̃2 . It
is well known that test scores measuring, e.g., cognitive skill, have no inherent scale, meaning any
monotonic (increasing) transformations (e.g., logarithms) are also valid measures (see, e.g., Cunha
and Heckman, 2008). Given the earlier argument that qualitative differences in inputs drive the
analysis, and the known sensitivity of achievement tests to monotonic transformations (Bond and
Lang, 2013), it is reasonable to use the estimator of βy as an approximation for λw . In a similar
way, we can use ∆yt , which corresponds to the estimated difference in value added between the
treatment and control groups, to measure ∆w̃t , the difference in achievement for the students re30

λκ fixes the scale of pre-treatment teacher human capital, which is unobserved and yields no direct testable
implications. Setting λζ = 1 may not strictly be a pure normalization, as a null ATE on achievement in the activetreatment period could stem from λζ = 0 and/or ∆ζ̃1 = 0. However, both of these parameters must be nonzero to
match the positive ATE in the data; given this, then, setting λζ = 1 is innocuous.
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spectively representing the treatment and control groups. Putting all of this together, the bounds
obtained for (δI , δh ) would also apply to (γι , γζ ).

B

Estimation of Confidence Sets

This appendix describes the algorithm used to estimate the confidence sets for δh and δI .
Algorithm 1 Bootstrap estimation of confidence sets
for s = 1 . . . nSamp do
Sample observations from treatment and control groups (stratified by treatment group)
ˆ s , ∆y
ˆ s , ∆y
ˆ s)
Estimate (β̂ys , ∆l
1
1
2
Use simulated values to create locus defined by eq. (8)
Project locus onto marginals, obtaining random intervals dˆsh , dˆsI
end for
for k = h, I do
for dtry
k ⊆ Dk do
PnSamp ˆs
1
1{dk ⊆ dtry
retain dtry
s=1
k }≥1−α
k iff nSamp
end for
end for
try
(1 − α)% confidence set for δk is arg min dtry retained {max{dtry
k } − min{dk }}
k
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